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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of Order No. 33928 Final Order Denying Reconsideration ("Final 
Order") in Idaho Public Utilities Commission Case No. IPC-E-16-28, issued by the Idaho Public 
Utilities Commission ("IPUC") on November 17, 2017. The Final Order denied Ms. Tidwell's 
petition for reconsideration concerning an award of intervenor funding. Intervenor funding 
awards are provided for under Idaho Code§ 61-617A. However, the IPCU denied Ms. Tidwell's 
request for intervenor funding because it was received after August 22, 2017. Ms. Tidwell 
contends that the agency failed to properly notice the August 22, 2017 deadline, and that the 
administrative rule governing intervenor funding requests is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse 
of discretion, in addition to being unconstitutionally vague. This appeal seeks an award of 
attorney fees and clarification of administrative law questions related to intervenor funding 
requests. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
On December 5, 2016, Kiki Leslie A. Tidwell ("Ms. Tidwell") petitioned to intervene in 
Idaho Power's Application for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for Wood River 
Valley in IPUC Case No. IPC-E-16-28. Ms. Tidwell was the first intervenor in this case. 
Between November 29, 2016 and June 27, 2017, the IPUC published eleven notices or orders 
that were available to intervenors. On August 8, 2017, the IPUC held a technical hearing that 
was scheduled to continue on August 9, 2017, if needed. R. vol. I, pp. 77-78. 
Appellant's Brief - 1 
On September 15, 2017, the IPUC granted Idaho Power's Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) and awarded intervenor funding to the Sierra Club in Order 
No. 33872. R. vol. I, pp. 143-160. September 15, 2017 was the first time Ms. Tidwell was aware 
that intervenor funding requests were available to intervenors and that the time to apply for 
intervenor funding requests had passed. 
On September 16, 2017, Ms. Tidwell filed an intervenor funding request with the IPUC. 
R. vol. I, pp. 164-174. On October 12, 2017, the IPUC denied Ms. Tidwell's request in Order 
No. 33906. R. vol. I, pp. 175-177. Ms. Tidwell filed a petition for reconsideration on October 23, 
2017. R. vol. I, pp. 178-179. The IPUC denied Ms. Tidwell's petition for reconsideration on 
November 17, 2017 in Order No. 33928. R. vol. I, pp. 180-182. This appeal was filed with the 
IPUC on December 27, 2017. R. vol. I, pp. 183-188. 
C. Statement of Facts 
IPUC Case No. IPC-E-16-28 began on November 28, 2016 and the final order was issued 
on November 17, 2017. In the almost year long process of this case, the IPUC never provided 
written notice of Rule 164, its requirements, or the August 22, 2017 deadline for intervenor 
funding requests. The only notice of the August 22, 2017 deadline that was provided to 
intervenors was a one sentence, oral proclamation by Commissioner Anderson at the August 8, 
2017 evidentiary hearing where he said, "Intervenor funding requests under Rule 164 are due 14 
days from today." R. vol. II, p. 686. This statement is only reflected in the transcript of the 
August 8, 2017 evidentiary hearing, which was unavailable to intervenors. Otherwise, if a party 
was to look back through the official record, Commissioner Anderson's determination that 
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intervenor funding requests were due 14 days from August 8, 2017 cannot be found, nor can it be 
reconstructed. 
Ms. Tidwell attended all of the IPUC hearings. Specifically, she attended the August 8, 
2017 evidentiary hearing, which was scheduled to continue the following day. While the August 
8, 2017 transcript states that Commissioner Anderson gave oral notice of the Rule 164 deadline, 
the record does not establish that Ms. Tidwell heard that announcement. R. vol. II, p. 686. In 
fact, Ms. Tidwell did not hear Commissioner's Anderson's oral pronouncement that intervenor 
funding requests were due 14 days from the August 8, 2017 evidentiary hearing. R. vol. I, p. 179. 
The announcement of the deadline by Commissioner Anderson was made just moments before 
5:27 PM, after an all day long hearing. Tellingly, Commissioner Anderson described his sole 
comment about Rule 164 as a "little housekeeping thing[]." R. vol. II, p. 686. The legal right and 
opportunity to request $18,538.47 in intervenor funding is not a little housekeeping thing. 
On September 15, 2017, Ms. Tidwell received the first notice that intervenor funding 
requests were due on August 22, 2017 when Order No. 33872, which awarded intervenor 
funding to the Sierra Club, was received in the mail. R. vol. I, pp. 143-160. Prior to September 
15, 2017, Ms. Tidwell was unaware of the intervenor funding availability. Ms. Tidwell submitted 
her application for intervenor funding one day after receiving IPUC Order No. 33872, which was 
the first time Ms. Tidwell was aware of the availability and deadline for intervenor funding. Ms. 
Tidwell was unaware of the opportunity to apply for intervenor funding, and Order No. 33872 
was the first notice she received indicating the availability and deadline for intervenor funding 
requests. 
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Ms. Tidwell's application for intervenor funding acknowledges that it was submitted late 
per the IPUC's August 22, 2017 deadline, and it tries to reasonably explain the tardiness; her 
initial application was a good-faith attempt at cooperation and acceptance of the agency's 
deadline. R. vol. I, pp. 164-165, 178-179. Ms. Tidwell hoped that by acting in good-faith, the 
IPUC would use its discretion to award her late intervenor funding request as it had previously 
done in IPUC Case No. IPC-E-17-03. Unfortunately for Ms. Tidwell, the IPUC denied her 
application without ever considering whether she met the relevant factors under Idaho Code § 
61-617 A, and they used her good-faith attempt at fixing this procedural error as justification to 
deny her request. R. vol. I, pp.175-177, 180-182. 
The IPUC denied Ms. Tidwell's request solely because it was received after the purported 
August 22, 2017 deadline for intervenor funding requests. R. vol. I, pp. 180-182. The denial was 
based on Idaho Administrative Procedure Act Rules 31.01.01.161-165, which provide procedural 
rules for intervenor funding requests. Specifically, IDAPA 31.01.01.164 (Rule 164) states: 
Unless otherwise provided by order, an intervenor requesting intervenor funding 
must apply no later than fourteen (14) days after the last evidentiary hearing in a 
proceeding or the deadline for submitting briefs, proposed orders, or statements of 
position, whichever is last. Motions in opposition to intervenor funding must be 
filed within fourteen (14) days after the request for intervenor funding is filed. 
Rule 164 is the heart of this appeal because it was the legal justification for denying Ms. 
Tidwell's request for intervenor funding. 
The IPUC did not provide adequate notice to intervening parties that August 22, 
2017 was the deadline for intervenor funding applications under Rule 164. Similarly, the 
IPUC failed to give proper notice to intervenors that any of the other triggering events 
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provided for in Rule 164 had occurred. As explained below, without the !PUC making a 
determination that Rule 164 is in effect, it is impossible for intervenors to accurately 
determine the correct intervenor funding request due date. As written, Rule 164 requires a 
determination by the !PUC that its 14-day deadline is in effect. 
Ms. Tidwell's argument, therefore, relies on the fact that the August 22, 2017 deadline 
for intervenor funding applications was not noticed in writing, and that her application for 
intervenor funding was denied solely on the basis of the August 22, 2017 deadline. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Ms. Tidwell presents the following issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the !PUC failed to provide adequate notice to all parties that intervenor 
funding requests were due on August 22, 2017. 
2. Whether the IPUC's denial of Appellant's intervenor funding request based solely 
on timing is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion because the !PUC 
previously awarded intervenor funding to late applicants. 
3. Whether the !PUC violated Idaho Code § 61-617 A because it denied Ms. 
Tidwell 's application solely based on timing. 
4. Whether the August 8, 2017 was "the last evidentiary hearing in a proceeding or 
the deadline for submitting briefs, proposed orders, or statements of position," 
under Rule 164. 
5. Whether Rule 164 is unconstitutional for reason of vagueness. 
6. Whether Ms. Tidwell is entitled to an award of attorney fees . 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Commission is authorized to award intervenor funding requests pursuant to statute. 
The Supreme Court employs an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing such decisions. Idaho 
Fair Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n, 113 Idaho 959, 751 P.2d 107 (1988), rev'd on other 
grounds. J.R Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 862, 820 P.2d 1206, 
1219 (1991). "The wording of LC.§ 61-617A makes it evident that the Commission is vested 
with the discretion to award attorney's fees and costs ... The decision of the adjudicating body 
awarding fees will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." Id. at 963, 7 51 P .2d at 111. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. IPUC failed to provide adequate notice to all parties that intervenor 
funding requests were due on August 22, 2017. 
The first issue on appeal is whether the IPUC gave adequate notice of the August 22, 
2017 deadline for intervenor funding requests to comply with procedural due process 
requirements. 
Rule 164 is a procedural rule that establishes a 14-day window for intervenors to apply 
for intervenor funding requests. IDAPA 31.01.01.164. According to Rule 164, intervenor 
funding requests are due "no later than fourteen (14) days after the last evidentiary hearing in a 
proceeding or the deadline for submitting briefs, proposed orders, or statements of position, 
whichever is last." Id. This court has also long held that "[t]o satisfy an essential requisite of 
procedural due process, a 'hearing' must be prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs 
the parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet." State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 914, 
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500 P.2d 209 (1972). In Gibbs, a criminal summons only informed the defendant that the issue to 
be heard was guilt or innocence. However, at the hearing, the court also entertained a 
jurisdictional question not contemplated in the summons. The Supreme Court of Idaho found that 
the defendant did not have adequate notice of the issues that would be heard, and thus, his due 
process rights were violated for lack of notice. But, most important to the case at hand, is IDAP A 
31.01.01.016.01 (Rule 16), which requires all notices of the IPUC to be either mailed or emailed. 
The IPUC did not provide notice that Rule 164 was an issue that would be contemplated 
at the August 8, 2017 evidentiary hearing, nor did it provide a mailed or emailed notice of the 
Rule 164 deadline as required by Rule 16. The IPUC also did not provide prior notice to 
intervenors that the August 8, 2017 evidentiary hearing would be the last evidentiary hearing or 
that August 8, 2017 was the last date for submitting briefs, proposed orders, or statements of 
position (see IDAPA 31.01.01.164). In fact, the scheduling order for the August 8, 2017 
technical hearing included an additional day for the evidentiary hearing (August 9, 2017), and it 
was silent as to Rule 164. R. vol. I, p. 78. Similarly, the IPUC did not provide notice to 
intervenors after the August 8, 2017 hearing that Rule 164 was in effect as of August 8, 2017, 
and that the due date for intervenor funding requests was August 22, 2017. The only time in the 
entire ten-month proceeding that the IPUC mentioned Rule 164 was at the August 8, 2017 
technical hearing when Commissioner Anderson devoted a one-sentence oral pronouncement 
that, "Intervenor funding requests under Rule 164 are due 14 days from today." R. Partial Tr. 
vol. II, p. 686. 
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The inadequacy of this oral pronouncement is the crux of Ms. Tidwell's argument. There 
is simply no way to verify that Ms. Tidwell or the other intervenors heard Commissioner 
Anderson, and Ms. Tidwell strongly contends that oral announcements of deadlines for 
legislatively enacted rights is wholly inadequate. Rule 16 requires all notices to be mailed or 
emailed. Prior to Commissioner Anderson's statement, intervenors had no indication that the 
time limit contemplated in Rule 164 would begin on August 8, 2017. Had intervenors wished to 
go back and determine when the time limit in Rule 164 began, they would be unable to do so 
because there was no notice in the record available to intervenors that would allow them to make 
such a determination independent of an actual order or notice. If an intervenor had a hearing 
disability they would have similarly not known about the Rule 164 deadline, and the IPUC 
would be at risk of Americans with Disabilities Act violations. Or, had an intervenor been in 
conversation with counsel for the split second that Commissioner Anderson made his Rule 164 
announcement they would also be without notice of the deadline. Simply put, the IPUC failed to 
take the action required by Rule 16 and Idaho case law that would put intervenors on notice that 
the Rule 164 deadline had been set. 
This situation specifically and unfairly prejudiced those intervenors that either did not 
hear Commissioner Anderson's statement that funding requests were due August 22, 2017 or 
were not present due to other factors (it is our understanding that intervenor Laura Midgley was 
unable to attend the August 8, 2017 hearing and was similarly unaware of the intervenor funding 
deadline). The only notice of Rule 164 that could have been received by intervenors was if they 
happened to hear a one sentence proclamation made by Commissioner Anderson at 5:27 PM, 
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after an all-day technical hearing. R. Partial Tr. vol. II, 686. There are a myriad of ways in which 
oral notice fails to effectively set the intervenor funding request deadline, all of which can be 
remedied with a simple written statement setting forth the deadline for intervenor funding 
requests. Rule 16 provides a solution to this problem, but the IPUC failed to comply with its 
requirements. 
"One of the purposes of adequate notice is to inform the affected individuals of the issues 
to be presented at the hearing so they can reasonably prepare their case." State, Dept. of Law 
Enforcement v. Engberg, 109 Idaho 530, 533, 708 P.2d 935 (App. 1985) (citing State v. Gibbs, 
94 Idaho 908,500 P.2d 209 (1972)). Here, adequate notice was not given to Ms. Tidwell, and her 
legislatively granted right to request intervenor funding quietly passed. 
B. IPUC's denial of Appellant's intervenor funding request based solely 
on timing is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion because the IPUC has 
previously awarded intervenor funding to late applicants. 
The IPUC has previously granted late intervenor funding requests. In IPUC Case No. 
IPC-E-17-03, the Community Action Partnership Association ofldaho (CAPAI) submitted a late 
intervenor funding request. The IPUC's final order in that case granted CAP Al's late intervenor 
funding request. Curiously, in its order granting intervenor funding, the IPUC did not address the 
issue of timing for the intervenor funding request, and it was completely silent as to why it 
granted intervenor funding under Rule 164, even though the application was late. 
An agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion when there is a lack of 
reasoned decision-making. See Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley ("Lane Ranch II"), 
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145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007) (citing Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 
739,536 P.2d 729, 734 (1975)); Michael S. Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act: A Primer for the Practitioner, 30 Idaho L. Rev. 273, 365 (1993); and Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed whether agency actions need to be consistent with 
prior agency action. However, it has come close. 
In 1980, the Supreme Court ofldaho stated, "So long as the Commission enters sufficient 
findings to show that its action is not arbitrary and capricious, the Commission can alter its 
decisions." Washington Water Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 101 Idaho 567, 
579, 617 P.2d 1242,1254 (1980). But, several other state and federal decisions have 
contemplated this question more directly. Richard H. Seamon, Idaho Administrative Law: A 
Primer for Students and Practitioners, 51 Idaho Law Review 421, 443-444 (2015). The United 
States Supreme Court stated that "[a]n agency may not, for example, depart from a prior policy 
sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books." Fed. Commc'n Comm'n v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1800, 1811, 556 U.S. 502,515 (2009). In FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. the Commission's new policy concerning censoring certain expletives 
was not arbitrary or capricious because the FCC "acknowledged that its recent actions have 
broken new ground, taking account of inconsistent 'prior Commission and staff action' and 
explicitly disavowing them ... " Id at 1812, 517. The rule out of that case is that agencies must 
adequately explain inconsistencies with prior administrative actions if their inconsistent actions 
are going to be valid. 
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In Ms. Tidwell's case, the IPUC did exactly what FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 
explained was prohibited: it strictly construed Rule 164 without explanation, even though it had 
previously ignored the requirements of Rule 164 in CAPAI's request. The IPUC also failed to 
enter findings explaining why its earlier grant of late intervenor funding requests was appropriate 
in the CAPAI case, but not in Ms. Tidwell's case; the IPUC's decision to strictly construe Rule 
164's 14-day deadline was not explained or contemplated in light of the fact that they had 
previously allowed late intervenor funding applications. It seems that the IPUC simply decided, 
without explanation, that this was a case where Rule 164 would be applied strictly. Disregarding 
specific administrative rules in one instance while strictly enforcing them in others, and doing so 
sub silentio, is the exact kind of arbitrary and capricious action that the United States Supreme 
Court contemplated and prohibited in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc and the Idaho 
Supreme Court contemplated in Washington Water Power Co. v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm 'n. 
Ms. Tidwell's case is not unlike the CAPAI case, except that CAPAI's application for 
intervenor funding was accepted and approved, while Ms. Tidwell's application for intervenor 
funding was denied. The record shows that the IPUC denied Ms. Tidwell's intervenor funding 
request solely because it was submitted late. R. vol. I. pp. 175-176. Despite Ms. Tidwell applying 
for funding on the day that she became aware intervenor funding requests were due, the IPUC 
decided that it would strictly construe Rule 164, even though it had previously awarded late 
intervenor funding quests without any explanation. The inconsistency and lack of explanation for 
why the IPUC would accept one applicant's intervenor funding request while denying another's 
is the definition of arbitrary and capricious decision making and it is the very type of action 
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prohibited by administrative agencies. Ms. Tidwell respectfully asks this court to rule that 
inconsistent agency actions are only valid if adequately explained. 
C. IPUC violated Idaho Code§ 61-617A because it denied Ms. Tidwell's 
application solely based on timing. 
Idaho Code § 61-61 7 A sets out four standards upon which awards of intervenor funding 
requests are to be evaluated. The IPUC did not deny Ms. Tidwell's application for intervenor 
funding because it failed to comply with the factors of Idaho Code § 61-617 A, nor did any other 
parties to the case object to Ms. Tidwell's request for intervenor funding. Instead, the IPUC 
found a convenient way to deny Ms. Tidwell's application for intervenor funding due to a 
procedural error for which she was unaware because the deadline had not been properly noticed. 
The legislature did not intend for the public to fall victim to complex and unknown procedural 
rules when seeking costs and attorney fees. Instead, the intent of the legislature was 
unmistakably codified in Idaho Code§ 61-617A(I), which states that it is "the policy of this state 
to encourage participation at all stages of all proceedings before the commission so that all 
affected customers receive full and fair representation in those proceedings." 
Such a policy is directly opposed to tricky and unknown procedural rules that can be 
silently used to avoid legislatively mandated policies. The IPUC has discretion in implementing 
this law, but that discretion must be reasoned and based in fact. Lane Ranch Partnership v. City 
of Sun Valley ("Lane Ranch II"), 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007) (citing Enterprise, 
Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734,739,536 P.2d 729, 734 (1975)); Michael S. Gilmore & Dale 
D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act: A Primer for the Practitioner, 30 Idaho L. 
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Rev. 273,365 (1993); and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983). And, when looked at in conjunction with Idaho Code§ 61-617A, it is clear 
that the IPUC acted contrary to the legislatively enacted policy of Idaho Code § 61-617 A and 
beyond the authorization given to it by the legislature. 
Denying Ms. Tidwell's application solely on the basis of Rule 164 is antithetical to the 
legislature's intent, and beyond the authority delegated to the IPUC as an administrative agency 
because the IPUC failed to consider the appropriate factors. 
D. The August 8, 2017 evidentiary hearing was not "the last evidentiary 
hearing in a proceeding or the deadline for submitting briefs, proposed orders, or 
statements of position," under Rule 164. 
Even if the court determines that notice of Rule 164 was sufficient, the IPUC incorrectly 
determined that Rule 164 went into effect on the August 8, 2017 evidentiary hearing. Unless 
otherwise stated in an order, Rule 164 states that intervenor funding requests are due 14 days 
after the last evidentiary hearing in a proceeding or the deadline for submitting briefs, proposed 
orders, or statements of position, whichever is last. IDAP A 31.01.01.164. 
The IPUC failed to take into account that the date of the last deadline for submitting 
briefs was November 2, 2017, which is 21 days after the Final Order was served and the due date 
for petitions for reconsideration. R. vol. I, p. 176. Under IDAPA 31.01.01.255 (Rule 255), any 
party may move to file briefs, proposed orders, or statements of position. Thus, because final 
orders by the IPUC are all subject to petitions for reconsiderations, the deadline to submit briefs, 
proposed orders, or statements of position had not yet passed. 
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Without an order to the contrary, the Rule 164 deadline would not have begun until 14 
days after November 2, 2017, at the earliest. The true deadline for filing intervenor funding 
requests was November 16, 2017, which would have been 14 days after the last opportunity to 
file briefs, proposed orders, or statements of position without an order stating otherwise. Any 
requests prior to that date would have opened up intervenors to additional attorney fees if 
petitions for reconsideration and other further proceedings occurred. 
Based on the November 2, 2017 deadline for submitting petitions for reconsideration, the 
deadline for submitting briefs, proposed orders, or statements of position under Rule 164 was 
after August, 8, 2017, and the 14-day window to apply for intervenor funding was actually 
between November 2, 2017 and November 16, 2017. Under the plain language of Rule 164, 
August 22, 2017 would only be the intervenor funding deadline if an order "otherwise stated." 
Since there was no order, the deadline for submitting applications for intervenor funding was 
after August 22, 2017. 
Ms. Tidwell's request for intervenor funding was submitted on September 16, 2017, a 
month before the November 16, 2017 deadline. Ms. Tidwell's request for intervenor funding was 
timely and should not have been dismissed because it was late. 
E. Rule 164 is unconstitutional for reason of vagueness. 
As written, Rule 164 is arbitrary and capricious because it is too imprecise and vague to 
accurately determine when the rule takes effect. After the above discussion, it should be clear 
that Rule 164 is extremely vague when applied to real-world IPUC cases because numerous 
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interpretations of Rule 164 are plausible, and the justification for picking one over the other is 
act in arbitrary decision-making. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that agency rules cannot be overly 
vague. "[T]he void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due 
process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may 
act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do 
not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way." FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
2307, 2317, 567 U.S. 239,254 (2012). 
Intervenors are unable to know what is required of them under Rule 164, unless a written 
order is provided by the IPUC. But, adding to the confusion is that the IPUC's interpretation of 
Rule 164 is often at odds with intervenor's interpretations. As demonstrated by this IPUC case 
and other cases involving intervenor funding, Rule 164 does not allow the IPUC to act with 
precision or the necessary guidance in enforcing Rule 164. Without written notice of Rule 164 or 
an order stating the Rule 164 deadline, it is difficult to determine the date of the last evidentiary 
hearing or when the last deadline for briefs, proposed orders, or statements of position are due. 
Additionally, Rule 252 allows the commissioner to continue hearings, making it impossible to 
know with any certainty when "the last evidentiary hearing" will occur unless the last evidentiary 
hearing is noticed after it has occurred. IDAP A 31.01.01.252. That did not happen in Ms. 
Tidwell's case. 
Similarly, and as mentioned above, a petition for reconsideration opens the door for 
briefs, proposed orders, and statements of position. See Building Contractors Assn. of 
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Southwestern Idaho v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n., 151 Idaho 10,253 P.3d 684 (2011); 
IDAPA 31.01.01.252 and 255. Without a determination by the IPUC that the Rule 164 deadline 
would be on a date certain, it is impossible for intervenors to determine the deadline for 
intervenor funding requests because Rule 164 is too imprecise and vague. 
While the intent of Rule 164 is obvious - and Ms. Tidwell has no objection to the simple 
existence of a deadline for intervenor funding requests - the language of the rule creates 
somewhat of an unknowable and imprecise deadline that even a seasoned attorney has a hard 
time figuring out, let alone a non-attorney intervenor. A rule that cannot be accurately predicted 
as to when it takes effect can only be applied arbitrarily and capriciously, and necessarily 
violates the Vagueness Doctrine as stated in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. A rule as vague 
as Rule 164 cannot hold muster against the requirements of the Constitution. 
As a result, while a 14-day deadline for submitting intervenor funding requests is 
eminently reasonable, when that deadline occurs must be accurately determinable and applied 
consistently. Rule 164 cannot achieve this low bar, as written. As a result, it is unconstitutional 
for reason of vagueness. 
F. Ms. Tidwell is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
Ms. Tidwell was required to obtain the advice and services of counsel to bring this appeal 
and is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to the private attorney 
general doctrine, Idaho Code § § 12-117, 61-617 A, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
Appellant's Brief - 16 
I. This Case Satisfies the Requirements of the Private Attorney General Exception to 
the American Rule on Attorney Fees. 
The private attorney general doctrine forms a strong basis for an award of attorney fees in 
this case. The private attorney general doctrine was developed to allow for an award of attorney 
fees when an action meets three specific requirements: (I) the strength or societal importance of 
the public policy indicated by the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the 
magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff, (3) the number of people standing to benefit 
from the decision. Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 577-78, 682 P.2d 524, 530-31 (1984). 
The societal importance of the public policy requiring adequate notice is enshrined by the 
Due Process clause of 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and its application to states via 
the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Due process, specifically proper notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, are fundamental to the rule oflaw in the United States of America. 
Similarly, administrative bodies in this country are required to act in a reasoned decision-making 
process. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476,484 (2011), see also FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. 556 U.S. 502, 53 7 (2009) ("If [a] [ federal] agency takes action not based on neutral 
and rational principles, the [ federal] AP A grants federal court power to set aside the agency 
action as 'arbitrary' or 'capricious"'); Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 
359, 374 (1998) ("adjudication is subject to the requirement ofreasoned decision making"). 
Additionally, the Idaho legislature has specifically stated that it is the policy of the State 
of Idaho to encourage intervenor funding, and encouraging intervenor shall take the form of 
reimbursing intervenors for attorney fees and costs. This litigation is a direct result of this 
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legislatively enacted public policy. Thus, the societal importance of ensuring that administrative 
agencies act within these boundaries is paramount to upholding the public policy mandated by 
the U.S. Constitution and expanded by the Idaho legislature. 
Holding the IPUC accountable to administrative law requirements of proper notice and 
due process is necessarily the duty of private citizens. Since administrative agencies, like the 
IPUC, are subdivisions of the state, the attorney general's office is more often devoted to 
defending agency action. Only private citizen action can hold the administrative bodies 
accountable to the low burden of reasoned decision making, and only private citizens will bring 
suits arguing against specific administrative rules. 
Finally, the number of people that stand to benefit from this action is significant because 
requiring proper notice procedures for Rule 164 will affect all future intervenors in public utility 
cases. For all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Tidwell respectfully requests an award of attorney 
fees under the private attorney general doctrine, to include those requested by her as an 
intervenor and the additional costs required to bring this action. 
2. Idaho Code § 12-117 is an appropriate basis for an award of attorney fees because the 
IPUC's actions were arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
Idaho Code § 12-11 7 provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party and 
against a state agency or other political subdivision if the non-prevailing party acts without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. Idaho Code § 12-117 serves "as a deterrent to groundless or 
arbitrary action and to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified 
financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes 
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agencies should never have made." Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 
Idaho 121, 138, 176 P.3d 126, 143 (2007). 
An action that is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion is necessarily an action 
brought without reasonable basis in law. 
As a result, and if Ms. Tidwell is the prevailing party, Idaho Code § 12-11 7 provides Ms. 
Tidwell with an avenue to recover attorney fees and costs. 
3. Idaho Code § 61-61 7 A is an appropriate basis for an award of attorney fees because 
Ms. Tidwell meets the substantive requirements for such an award. 
Idaho Code § 61-61 7 A allows intervenors in public utility commission cases to recoup 
some or all of their costs associated in participating. The intent of this statute is clear: encourage 
public participation in otherwise inaccessible administrative procedures. In Ms. Tidwell's initial 
application to the IPUC for intervenor funding, she explained why she qualified for intervenor 
funding under the stated factors. R. vol. I, pp. 164-165. Ms. Tidwell's rationale for why she 
deserves an award of attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code § 61-61 7 A are the same now as 
they were in September, except that her current appeal also stands to significantly clarify and 
improve the intervenor funding process for all future intervenors. Ms. Tidwell has satisfied the 
requirements to receive intervenor funding because she materially contributed to the IPUC's 
decision, the costs claimed are reasonable and constitute a significant financial hardship for Ms. 
Tidwell, her recommendation to the IPUC differed materially from the testimony and exhibits of 
the IPUC, and Ms. Tidwell 's participation addressed issues of concern to the general public 
affected by Idaho Power's proposal. Furthermore, the IPUC did not deny Ms. Tidwell's 
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application for intervenor funding for failing to satisfy the above requirements. Instead, her 
application for intervenor funding was denied solely based on timing. 
Ms. Tidwell meets the statutory requirements to receive funding from the IPUC. 
Furthermore, the IPUC did not deny her initial applications for intervenor funding based on the 
statutory factors required under Idaho Code § 61-617 A. Ms. Tidwell respectfully requests that 
she be awarded the attorney fees and costs associated with her original application for fees and 
costs, in addition to the costs and fees associated with this current appeal as a continuation of her 
original intervenor action. 
4. Ms. Tidwell seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Appellate Rule 40. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 provides an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. If Ms. 
Tidwell prevails on her appeal, she respectfully asks this court to award attorney fees. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Order No. 33928 should be set aside. Ms. Tidwell should be 
awarded attorney fees and costs to the full extent allowed by Idaho Code § 61-617 A. Ms. 
Tidwell also respectfully requests reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this lQ_ day of April, 2018. 
Samue . Linnet 
Attorney for Appellant/Intervenor 
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